We examine the e ects that political institutions, i.e., electoral systems and legislative processes, have on income taxation and public goods provision. We c haracterize the equilibrium income tax schedules and the optimality conditions under two t ypes of political institutions, a t wo-party plurality system with a single district, and one with multiple districts where tax policies are determined through a legislature. It is shown that the exogenous social welfare functions in the optimal taxation literature can be endogenously determined by explicitly modeling the political institutions, which put di erent w elfare weights on di erent subsets of the population. This paper also extends the Coughlin probabilistic voting model and the Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining model to a function space. JEL Classi cation Code: H21, D72, D78
Introduction
We study how di erent political institutions a ect economic policies in a general equilibrium model of voting over income taxation and public goods provision. We compare the equilibrium tax schedules of two di erent kinds of institutions: a two-party plurality system with a single district, and one with multiple districts where the tax policy is determined through a legislature.
Traditionally, the optimal income taxation literature, starting from Mirrlees 1971 , studies the features of income tax schedules, which arise when a social planner maximizes an exogenously given social welfare function, subject to incentive compatibility constraints and an exogenously given revenue requirement. These models recognize the incentive e ects of income taxation. In the analysis, most of them start with unrestricted tax schedules, without a priori limitations. The main shortcoming of these models is the neglect of institutional constraints. The social welfare function is not derived explicitly. Therefore, one has no reason to believe that any particular social welfare function captures the political economy of real policy choices.
We model income taxation and public goods provision as the outcome of political processes. Traditionally, the archilles heel has been getting equilibrium in a multi-dimensional model of political equilibrium McKelvey 1979. Therefore, previous research in this area Roberts 1977 , Kramer and Snyder 1988 , Cukierman and Meltzer 1991 , Berliant and Gouveia 1991 . either start with a restricted set of tax schedules, such as a linear tax, or put restrictions on the environment. The only institutions studied previously is simple majority rule, and nearly all results focus on the median voter.
This model extends the probabilistic voting model and the Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining model to a function space, so we do not need to restrict the class of tax schedules. Furthermore, two types of political institutions are studied: a two-party plurality system under a single district, i.e., simple majority rule, and a two-party plurality system under multiple districts with a legislature deciding the nal policy outcome.
By explicitly modeling the political institutions, we can characterize the equilibrium tax sched-ules and conditions under which they are optimal, and thereby endogenously determine the social welfare function. Under plurality rule, the equilibrium tax schedule of two-candidate, single-district competition is compared with the equilibrium outcome from a legislative process when there are multiple districts. We establish that each equilibrium is equivalent to an optimal tax schedule for some social welfare weights. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium which arises in a two-party, single-district competition puts equal welfare weight o ver the whole population, while the equilibrium tax schedule of the legislative process puts more weight on those subsets of the population whose legislators are in the majority coalition. In Section 2 we construct a general equilibrium model where the level of public good is endogenously determined. Section 3 includes a survey of voting models, with special emphasis on the probabilistic voting model and an extension of the equilibrium result to a function space. Section 4 presents a characterization of the equilibrium income tax schedules under a two-party plurality system for a single district, and that of a stochastic legislative game when there are multiple districts. Optimality conditions for these equilibria are also derived, thus establishing the relationship between these positive models and traditional optimal income taxation models. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
A general equilibrium model is constructed in which the amount of public good is endogenously determined. The general problem analyzed in this section uses a framework similar to that of Mirrlees 1971 , but includes a public good, nanced by the tax revenue instead of having an exogenous revenue requirement. This model serves as a building block for the introduction of political institutions. It turns out that the equilibrium outcomes of the two political institutions we consider will be special cases of the optimal income tax model, in the sense that the equilibrium tax schedules from political processes are as if some social welfare functions are maximized. Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes of the political processes correspond to two points on the second best frontier.
Suppose individuals are identi ed by a single parameter, ! 2 = !; ! R ++ , which can be interpreted as the wage rate or ability level of an individual. Assume that ! F, and that ! has a density function f!, and f! 0 a.s. on . Call an individual whose ability-parameter is ! a !-person. The individual parameter, !, is private information, but its distribution is common knowledge. There are three commodities: a consumption good, x 2 R + , labor, l 2 0; 1 , and a public good, y 2 R + . W e normalize the endowment of time to 1. Let I! = !l be the income of the !-person, which is observable by the government. The utility function, ux; l; y satis es the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 ux; l; y = x + l;y, where ; is concave, C 3 , u 2 = 1 0, u 3 = 2 0, u 23 = 0 , and satis es the Inada conditions: lim l!1 u 2 x; l; y = ,1; lim y!0 u 3 x; l; y = 1:
As usual, the Inada conditions are introduced to guarantee interior solutions. Additive separability is not essential for the general results, but will greatly simplify the algebra.
Assumption 2 The marginal utility of leisure i s c onvex.
Assumption 2 is introduced so that the second order condition is satis ed when we later use the rst order approach to solve the optimal taxation problem. One example that satis es Assumptions 1 and 2 is ux; l; y = x + ln1 , l + 1 , l n y.
Let I! = !l be the income of the !-person. Then I : ! R + is de ned as the income function, and T : R + ! R is de ned as the income tax function. W e use the revelation principle to analyze the general equilibrium optimal taxation problem 1 . De ne a revenue requirement function, 1 I thank Miguel Gouveia for pointing out their application of this approach to the optimal taxation problem. See Berliant and Gouveia 1994. : ! R. The problem of taxation of income the indirect mechanism is transformed to the direct mechanism: an agent reports his type, !, based on which he is required to supply labor, l!, and pay taxes, !. We w ant to nd a tax function T that implements in the sense that TI!; T = !. The revenue requirement function satis es the following assumption:
Assumption 3 The revenue requirement function, : ! R, is lower semicontinuous and bounded, i.e.,
Note that the upper bound of the revenue requirement function is a feasibility condition, which s a ys that you cannot tax a person more than the maximum she could possibly earn. Note also that the particular lower bound of the revenue requirement function is not important. All we need is some lower bound to get a compact policy space, i.e., the government cannot subsidize any individual an in nite amount. The following lemma states the familiar monotonicity condition in this context. Lemma 1 Monotonicity There exists a revenue requirement function, , such that l; are truthfully implementable in dominant strategies if and only if l is increasing.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Therefore, any incentive compatible equilibrium labor supply schedule must satisfy this monotonicity condition. It is straightforward that if l is increasing then I is nondecreasing. I.e., in equilibrium, after all behavioral adjustments, income must be a nondecreasing function of ability.
Given a revenue requirement function, !, and a labor supply function, l!, a !-person chooses to report his type, ! 0 , to maximize his utility, max ! 0 u!l! 0 , ! 0 ; l ! 0 ; y : Solving this problem gives us an individual's optimal reported type, !, and thus, his optimal labor supply, l!, his optimal amount of income, I!, and the individual's private good consumption, x! = I! , !. The total supply of labor adjusted for quality i s L s = R !l!dF!, the aggregate demand for the private good is X d = R x!dF!, and the total tax revenue is R !dF!. On the production side, assume that rms are price-takers. The input for the production of the private good is labor which, adjusted for quality, equals L d = R !l!dF!. The public good is produced from the private good.
Assume that all rms are identical and that they maximize pro t by c hoosing the optimal amount of labor input in the production of the private good and the public good. The production functions of the private good and the public good are assumed to be linear. The total amount o f private good produced is X T = aL, and the total amount of public good produced from the private good is y = bX T , X, where X is the total private good consumption. Normalize the price of the private good to 1, and let the price of the public good be p. In equilibrium, the rms' pro t is The government uses the tax revenue to purchase the public good. Therefore, the balanced budget 
The Probabilistic Voting Model and An Extension
In studying the equilibrium income tax schedules under various political institutions, the most di cult part is the existence of equilibrium when the issue space exceeds one dimension. The de-terministic Downsian model, which assumes complete information and no uncertainty, t ypically provides no predictions when there are two or more dimensions to the policy space. This di culty for obtaining existence of an equilibrium is created, in part, by the discontinuity o f v oter's behavior. If candidate A o ers a voter an increment of utility o ver candidate B, then she will switch her vote to candidate A. One way to smooth out this discontinuity i s t o i n troduce uncertainty i n to voters' decision processes, which m a y also be a descriptively more accurate representation of the real decision processes.
One approach in Ledyard 1984 uses the Bayesian voting model, where voters' types and their costs of voting are private information. Abstention is allowed. In the resulting equilibrium, both candidates adopt the same platform that maximizes a Samuelson-Bergson social welfare function and nobody votes. The analysis is based on an individual being pivotal in an election, which is not applicable when there is a continuum of voters consumers.
An alternative w ay of modeling voting under uncertainty is the probabilistic voting model 2 , which can be understood as re ecting candidates' uncertainty about whom the individual voters will vote for. It uses standard statistical models for discrete choice in a game theoretic setting.
We use this approach to analyze voting over income taxation and public goods provision. We will brie y go over the underlying rationale for this approach, and then extend the results to a function space.
The Probabilistic Voting Model
Consider an electorate where everyone votes. In the two candidate case, this means that the probability with which an individual ! chooses candidate i, P i T 1 ; T 2 ; ! , given i's platform, T i , This approach draws on the multinomial logit framework commonly used in econometric models of discrete choice see, e.g., Amemiya 1985, Chapter 9. Notice the only di erence between the probabilistic voting model and the logit model is how the error term enters the utility function: it enters additively in the logit model and multiplicatively in the probabilistic voting models.
Therefore, a candidate's expected vote equals
Assume that each candidate's objective function is to maximize expected plurality, which i s equivalent to maximizing the probability of winning in a large electorate. De ne the expected plurality for candidate 1 as Therefore, in a two-candidate competition under plurality rule, the equilibrium policy outcome is the maximand of the Nash social welfare function, A = R ln uT;!dF!.
There have been some criticisms of the probabilistic voting model, mostly stemming from the assumption on the error terms in individual decision making. To construct a discrete choice model that will produce predictions consistent with the underlying theory, a n y proper, continuous probability distribution de ned over the real line will su ce 3 . The logistic distribution is chosen because of its mathematical simplicity and its resemblance to the normal distribution. Note that the existence of majority rule equilibrium in multi-dimensional policy space is robust to speci c assumptions on the distribution of errors, although the optimality condition in Theorem 1 might be sensitive t o these assumptions. How the optimality condition might c hange if another probability distribution is assumed needs to be worked out, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Although, like most other voting models, experimental or empirical testings of the probabilistic voting model itself have not been performed, we can gain some con dence from the laboratory performance of a very similar type of model, the Quantal Response Equilibrium model McKelvey and Palfrey 1995. For a logistic speci cation of the error structure as well, the Quantal Response Equilibrium model ts a variety of experimental datasets fairly successfully.
Extension of Probabilistic Voting Results
To study the equilibrium tax structure, we need to extend Theorem 1 to cover the case in which the policy belongs to a function space. Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 establish the compactness of the policy space.
Lemma 2 After tax consumption, x!;! t , is nondecreasing in !, where ! t is his true type, and ! is his reported type.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 is used to put more structure on the revenue requirement function, as is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 ! is of bounded variation.
Proof: See Appendix A. 3 See, e.g., Econometric Analysis by W. H. Green, p.662 -666.
Let BV a; b denote the space of functions of bounded variation on a; b . De ne X = f : lower semicontinuous and of BVg, and X l = fl : increasingg. The policy space is therefore X = fl 2 X l ; 2 X : I:C:g, where I:C:stands for the incentive compatibility constraint. To prove the existence of the electoral equilibrium, we need to show that X is compact. Lemma 4 The policy space X is compact.
Having established the compactness of the policy space, we proceed to prove that Theorem 1 can be extended to a function space. Note that in our setting the concavity of the indirect utility function in the policy proposal, l; , is guaranteed by Assumption 2.
Corollary 1 establishes that the equilibrium tax schedule under a two-party plurality system with a single district can be obtained as if we are solving an optimal taxation problem, with the previously exogenously given social welfare function taking the form of the Nash social welfare function.
So far, we h a ve not assumed di erentiability of the revenue requirement function or the income function. The next corollary establishes that we can restrict our attention to the subset of di erentiable functions.
Corollary 2 If one party's equilibrium policy proposals are di erentiable functions, i ; l i , then it is an equilibrium for the other party to propose the same di erentiable functions.
Proof: It follows from the interchangeability conditions of the symmetric, two-person, zero-sum game.
From now on, for technical simplicity w e will restrict ourselves to di erentiable revenue requirement functions, , labor supply functions, l, and income tax functions, TI.
Characterization of Equilibrium Tax Functions and the Optimality Conditions
The results of Section 3 suggests that in equilibrium the outcome of political processes is as if some particular social welfare function is maximized. In the case of two-party plurality system under a single district, the equilibrium tax policy maximizes a Nash social welfare function. In this section, we start with a general optimal taxation model, and then proceed to characterize the equilibria of the two political institutions and the optimality conditions of these equilibria, which suggest that they are special cases of the optimal taxation model. The rst ty p e i s a t wo-party plurality system under a single district, which can be viewed as a simpli ed version of implementing the platform from a presidential election or the outcome of a simple majority rule referendum. For comparison, we also study the equilibrium policy outcome of a legislative game under a two-party plurality system with multiple districts.
The General Case: Optimal Taxation with Public Good
We use the revelation principle to analyze the general equilibrium optimal taxation problem. The following analysis uses the rst order approach.
Given a revenue requirement function, !, and a labor supply function, l!, a !-person chooses to report his type, ! 0 , to maximize his utility,
The rst order condition for this problem is
Truthful revelation requires du
Using the shorthand, l 0 !, to stand for dl! d! , and similarly for other variables, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes !l 0 ! , 0 ! + u 2 l 0 ! = 0 :
Recall Lemma 1 that l; is implementable in dominant strategies if and only if the labor supply schedule, l!, is increasing, which guarantees that the second order condition for the above incentive compatibility constraint is satis ed.
The optimal income tax problem is thus de ned as where Au! is some exogenously given, strictly increasing, concave and di erentiable welfare function. Eq.IC is the incentive compatibility constraint. Eq.M is the monotonicity constraint. The last four constraints, B1 to B4, are the boundary conditions which will be used to derive the transversality conditions. Our result is di erent from Mirrlees due to the endogeneity of the public good. We can get some immediate characterizations of the optimal income tax schedule, which is captured in the following lemma. Lemma Note that although the well-known result on the marginal tax rate of the lowest type remains true, the marginal tax rate of the highest type is generically nonzero when we i n troduce public goods into the model. The marginal tax rate depends on the distribution of types, the production technology of public goods, people's preference for public goods, as well as the exact form of the social welfare function, A. In the later sections we will demonstrate that speci c form of the social welfare function is determined by the political institutions.
Having characterized the optimal income tax schedule, we proceed to analyze how political institutions endogenously determine the exact weights of the social welfare function.
Two-party Plurality System Under a Single District
From Corollary 1, the equilibrium tax schedule for a two-party plurality system under a single district is the solution to the following optimization problem, Proof: Substituting ln u for Au in Eq.1, we get the above result.
Proposition 2 can be interpreted either as the equilibrium outcome of a two-party competition under a single district, or as the outcome of a national election, where the winning party candidate implements his platform. A more frequently used, and also more complicated political institution in determining public policies involves a legislature where each legislator is elected by plurality rule, and the nal policy is the result of a legislative bargaining game.
Multiple Districts Legislative Process
An alternative mechanism for deciding income tax schedules under a two-party plurality rule system is through the election of a legislative body. W e model the entire process as a two-stage game. In the rst stage, voters in each legislative district vote for a legislator, whose objective function is to maximize the probability of getting reelected. This voting game determines each legislator's equilibrium platform. In the second stage, the legislators, each with induced preferences, bargain to select an income tax schedule.
In the rst stage, suppose voters are sophisticated in the sense that they know their legislator is not going to be a dictator in the legislature, and that the policy outcome is through a complicated process according to some legislative rule, : fl j ; j g j2J ! l; . Then the probability that a !-person vote for the Incumbent from his district, given the Incumbent's platform, l I j ; I j , and the Challenger's platform, l C j ; C j , is P I l I j ; I j ; l C j ; C j = u l I j ; I j ; l ,j ; ,j ; ! u l I j ; I j ; l ,j ; ,j ; ! + u l C j ; C j ; l ,j ; ,j ; ! :
Then, applying Corollary 1 to each legislative district, in equilibrium, maximizing expected plurality or the expected probability of winning is equivalent to maximizing the Nash social welfare function for the district, taking the legislative rules, as given. The following corollary characterizes the equilibrium platform in each district. The second stage is a legislative game. We consider a generalized version of the Baron-Ferejohn random recognition rule, which i s a s t ylized version of the closed rule used in the U.S. House of Representatives. This version can be extended to incorporate many other di erent processes, as explained later. At the beginning of period t, legislator j is recognized as a proposer with probability p t j 2 0; 1 , P j2J p t i = 1 ; 8t. Whoever is recognized proposes a tax schedule, l t j ; t j , then every legislator votes yes or no simultaneously. If, under m-majority rule, the number who say y es" is greater than or equal to m, l t j ; t j becomes the new status quo and the game ends; otherwise, the game proceeds to period t + 1. If nothing gets passed forever, the payo to the legislators is zero: U j = 0, for all j 2 J. We model the legislative process as a stochastic game, , t = S t ; t ; t , where S t is the set of pure strategy n tuples, where t : S t ! Z i s a transition function specifying for each s t 2 S t a probability distribution t s t o n Z, the set of states that can be achieved in a game, and where t : S t ! X is an outcome function that speci es for each s t 2 S t an outcome t s t 2 X. Finally, w e use S = Q t2T S t to denote the collection of pure strategy n tuples, where S t = Q i2N s t i . Formally, Z = R P V is the set of states. We use z to denote the possible states the game moves to. We use R to denote the Recognition Game, P to denote the Proposal Game, and V to denote the Voting Game.
To simplify the analysis, committee structure in the legislature is not explicitly modeled here. One way to incorporate it is to model the committee game as a separate bargaining game prior to the legislative bargaining game. Because of the mathematical complexity i n volved, we do not incorporate it in this model. The U.S. Senate has increasingly resort to unanimity rule, which can be incorporated into the game by requiring m = jJj. B y v arying p t j we can also incorporate other rules, such as the sequential recognition rule and seniority rule. In all these variations, Proposition 3 still holds. In practice, one can think of some modi ed rules that cannot be incorporated in the generalized version of the Baron-Ferejohn rule, but we argue that it is general enough to capture the main features of many legislative processes, and yet still simple enough to give us a handle to model it rigorously.
In the legislative game, each legislator's objective function is to maximize the Nash social welfare function of his her district, given the legislative rules, subject to the incentive compatibility constraint and the monotonicity condition, as stated in Corollary 3.
As usual, there are an in nite number of equilibria to the stochastic game. We assume that when the group faces a set of equilibria which are all satisfactory from considerations of stability and e ciency, their attention is likely to be directed to a simple one" Baron and Kalai, 1993 . In what follows, we c haracterize the simplest equilibria involving no stage dominated strategies 4 .
The simplest equilibrium can be described by an automaton of size 4, with one rest" state the Recognition Game, one propose" state the Proposal Game, and the vote yes" and vote no" state the Voting Game. The resulting equilibria from the automaton are stationary equilibria, which i s c haracterized by a set of values fv t g R n for each stage of the game, and a strategy pro le 2 , such that a 8t, is a Nash equilibrium with payo function G t : t ! R n de ned by It is easy to show that there exists a vector of continuation values, U = U 1 ; U 2 ; ; U J , where U i = P j2J p j U i l j ; j , representing the expected payo s to player i at the beginning of each stage game. In the following proposition, we prove that the equilibrium strategy for legislator j is to vote yes with probability 1 i f U j l i ; i U j , and to vote no otherwise. The equilibrium strategy for any proposer is to maximize his own utility such that the least expensive" m , 1 members of the legislature would vote yes. Denote the set of legislators whose payo s from the proposed tax schedule are greater than or equal to their continuation value as M = fk 2 J : U k l j ; j U k g. Therefore, in equilibrium, proposer i proposes the tax schedule l i ; i that maximizes the Nash social welfare of his own district subject to the constraint that at least m , 1 other players also vote yes, and his proposal will be accepted. Baron 1993 characterizes similar equilibrium strategies with alternatives in the Euclidean space and presents a closed-form characterization of the equilibrium when the utility function is quadratic. Proposition 3 is a generalization of Baron's results when the set of alternatives lies in a function space with generalized utility functions.
Some more notations will be used in solving for the equilibrium tax schedule for the legislative game. Let i be the set of voters in legislator i's district. We will use the indicator function, The rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1, with Au = i !f i !+! j !f j ! ln u.
Notice the equilibrium tax schedule of the legislative process is di erent from that of the twocandidate competition. The di erence comes from the speci c forms of the social welfare functions. Therefore, individuals from districts whose legislators are not in the majority coalition get zero weight, while individuals whose legislators are in the majority coalition get positive w eights in the social welfare function. This con rms our conjecture that the welfare weights of the optimal income tax schedule are endogenously determined by the political processes.
One special case is when all districts are identical, i.e., when ij = 0 for all i 6 = j, then the single district case has the same policy outcome as the multiple district case. When the districts are hetereogeneous, however, the outcome of the legislative process in multiple districts will usually be di erent from that of single district. Although analytical solutions and further comparative statics results are di cult to obtain without more speci c assumptions on preferences and distributions of wage rates, we can compute the explicit equilibrium income tax schedules and public goods levels numerically once we parameterize the utility functions and distribution of wage rates see Chen 1994.
Conclusions
This paper has three contributions to the literature of voting and optimal income taxation. First, it extends the probabilistic voting model to a function space. Second, it extends the Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining model to a function space. Third, and perhaps most signi cantly, it endogenizes the social welfare functions in the normative optimal taxation literature by explicitly modeling di erent political institutions. Therefore, it provides a theoretical underpinning for viewing the prescriptions of normative economics as predictions about policy choices in di erent political equilibria.
We show that under a two-party plurality system with a single district, the equilibrium income tax is equivalent to an optimal tax schedule which puts equal welfare weight o ver the whole population; when there are multiple districts, however, the simplest subgame perfect stationary equilibrium to the legislative game is equivalent to an optimal tax schedule which puts more welfare weight on the subsets of the population whose legislators are in the winning coalition of the legislature. Thus we h a ve shown that the political processes endogenously determine the welfare weights of the optimal income taxation problem. Next, we show that l; 2 X is an equilibrium to the electoral game, if and only if it is a global maximum of EPl i l i ; i ; l; , given l ,i ; ,i = l; . This follows from the interchangeability condition for two-person, zero-sum games.
Let Wl; = R ln u!l, ;l;ydF!. We then show that l ; 2 argmaxWl; is equivalent to l ; 2 argmaxEPl i l i ; i ; l; , for i = 1 ; 2. Since ln u!l, ;l;y is a strictly monotone increasing concave function of u!l, ;l;y, then Wl; is concave i n l; . Therefore, every local maximum of Wl; is also a global maximum. Similarly, since EPl i l i ; i ; l; is concave in l i ; i , it follows that any of its local maxima is also a global maximum. So the rst order conditions for the maximization problems are both necessary and su cient. It su ces to show that the rst order conditions of the two functions are equivalent. We prove this by using calculus of variations. Proof of Proposition 1: This is a calculus of variations problem. We will present the transversality conditions rst, then solve for the rst order conditions with respect to and l, and last check the second order conditions.
De ne the function G as Step 4: Second order conditions.
To prove su ciency, w e need to check the concavity o f G. Since G is linear in l 0 and 0 , the Legendre and Weierstrass conditions are trivially satis ed. We only need to check the concavity of G in l and , which requires the matrix of the second partial derivatives with respect to l and to be negative semi-de nite. Since both A and u are concave i n l and , w e can decompose the matrix as a sum of two matrices where one of them is negative de nite. Then the su cient conditions are veri ed if the other matrix, derived from the incentive compatibility constraint, is concave i n l and . Using Assumption 1 that u is C 3 S t i = f0g; 8i 2 J; Recognition Game t s t z = 1 ; if z 2 P t s t = ; 8s t 2 S t : The Recognition Game is indexed by z 2 R. The order of recognition is randomly decided according to some exogenously given probabilities; therefore, the strategy set of each player is f0g.
The game proceeds to the Proposal Game with probability 1, and the null outcome prevails. 8s t 2 S t :
In the Voting Game, each player can vote either no or yes 0 or 1 to the proposed tax schedule.
If the new proposal, l i ; i , is accepted by at least m of the legislators, it becomes the new status quo; otherwise, the null outcome prevails for this period and the game moves to a new round starting from the Recognition game with probability 1 .
The main steps to prove Proposition 3 follow the de nition of stationary Nash equilibrium. We rst specify the values associated with the equilibrium strategies, and then show that these values are self-generating. The third step is to show that the strategies speci ed in the proposition are subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
The values of the games are de ned below. Next, we v erify that the strategies speci ed in Proposition 3 are subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies. Since the strategies are history-independent, it su ces to show that for each game element no player will bene t from a unilateral one-shot deviation. So the proposer has no positive incentive to defect unilaterally from his strategy speci ed in Proposition 3, which means that it is a Nash equilibrium for the Proposer. Since it is history independent, it is also a subgame perfect equilibrium.
For z 2 V , w e w ant t o c heck i f v oters' strategies speci ed in the proposition are Nash equilibrium strategies. We consider three cases:
1 When jMj m , n o v oter is pivotal, so they have no positive incentive to defect from their equilibrium strategies. Therefore, the voter strategies speci ed in the proposition are Nash equilibrium strategies. They are subgame perfect, since they are history independent. Q.E.D.
